Recent collision-finding attacks against hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 motivate the use of provably collision-resistant (CR) functions in their place. Finding a collision in a provably CR function implies the ability to solve some hard problem (e.g., factoring). Unfortunately, existing provably CR functions make poor replacements for hash functions as they fail to deliver behaviors demanded by practical use. In particular, they are easily distinguished from a random oracle. We initiate an investigation into building hash functions from provably CR functions. As a method for achieving this, we present the Mix-Compress-Mix (MCM) construction; it envelopes any provably CR function H (with suitable regularity properties) between two injective "mixing" stages. The MCM construction simultaneously enjoys (1) provable collision-resistance in the standard model, and (2) indifferentiability from a monolithic random oracle when the mixing stages themselves are indifferentiable from a random oracle that observes injectivity. We instantiate our new design approach by specifying a blockcipher-based construction that appropriately realizes the mixing stages.
Introduction
Background. SHA-1, a Merkle-Damgård style [23, 14] iterated function, is provably collision resistant under the assumption that its underlying compression function is collision resistant. But the recent collision-finding attacks against SHA-1 (and related hash functions) [37, 38] have made clear the point that assumptions of collision resistance are often unfounded in practice.
Rather than assuming collision resistance outright, several works [11, 21, 26, 33, 13] build functions for which the guarantee of collision resistance rests, in a provable way, on the hardness of some well-studied computational problem. As a simple example, consider the function H(m) = x m mod n where x is some fixed base and n is a (supposedly) hard-to-factor composite [26, 33] . This function is (what we shall call) provably CR since there exists a formal reduction showing that the ability to find collisions in H implies the ability to efficiently factor n.
But such a collision-resistant function is not a hash function, at least not when one attempts to define a hash function by its myriad uses in practice 1 . For example, hash functions are frequently used as a way to compress and 'mix-up' strings of bits in an 'unpredictable' way; here it seems clear that the intent is for the hash function to mimic a random oracle, a publicly available random function with a large domain. Unfortunately, the provably CR function H is a poor real-world instantiation of a random oracle. Note, for example, that H(2m) ≡ H(m) 2 (mod n), which would be true with exceedingly small probability if H were instead a random oracle. The very structure that gives H and other provably CR functions their collision-resistance thus renders them useless for many practical applications of hash functions [11, 36] .
On the other hand, recent results [12, 2, 10] offer constructions that 'behave' as random oracles (and are called pseudorandom oracles, or PROs) when the underlying primitives are themselves idealized objects, like fixed-input length random oracles or ideal ciphers. In theory then, a PRO is a secure hash functions in a very broad sense. But the security guarantees offered by a PRO only hold in an idealized model. When one steps outside of the ideal model in which the security proofs take place, the actual security guarantees are much less clear. As an example, Bellare and Ristenpart [2] have pointed out that the PRO constructions from [12] fail to be collision resistant when the underlying compression function is only assumed to be CR (rather than being a fixedinput-length random oracle). This paper. We begin an investigation into methods for building functions that are both provably CR in the standard model and provably pseudorandom oracles in idealized models. In particular, we offer a generic construction that we call Mix-Compress-Mix, or MCM; See Figure 1 . Essentially MCM is a way to encapsulate a provably CR function in such a way that the resulting object is a PRO when the encapsulation steps behave ideally, and yet remains provably collision resistant in the standard model (i.e., when the encapsulation steps are only complexity theoretic objects).
The construction is simple: first apply an injective "mixing" step E 1 to the input message, then compress the result using a provably CR function H, and finally apply a second injective "mixing" step E 2 to produce the output. Here H and E 1 can accept variable-input-lengths. Note that since MCM is building a hash function, the mixing steps E 1 and E 2 are necessarily deterministic and publically computable functions. By demanding that they also be injective, we have immediately that collisions against MCM imply collisions against H. We stress that no cryptographic assumptions about the mixing steps are needed to prove collision resistance of MCM.
At the same time, MCM behaves like a random oracle when E 1 , E 2 are PROs, and the CR hash function is close to regular (i.e., the preimage set of any particular output isn't too large). In All three components of MCM must be deterministic and publically computable.
fact, we will actually construct E 1 , E 2 to be pseudorandom injective oracles, or PRIOs; we'll say more about these in a moment. To make precise our use of the word "behaves" above, we use the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [22] . We'll prove that MCM is indifferentiable from a monolithic random oracle when the mixing steps E 1 and E 2 are indifferentiable from random oracles (that observe injectivity). While the formal results are quite technical, the practical intuition behind the security of MCM is straightforward: the mixing steps obfuscate input-output relationships of the underlying compressing step. Recall our provably CR example H(m) = x m mod n and the associated attack that distinguished it from a random oracle. Adapting that attack for use against H(M ) = E 2 (H(E 1 (M ))) requires that the adversary determine non-trivial input-output relationships across both E 1 and E 2 , too. One might be tempted to think a construction even simpler than MCM meets our goals. In Section 4 we discuss natural simplifications of MCM (e.g., dropping E 1 or lifting our stringent injectivity requirements), showing that these fall short in one way or another. Moreover, we review in more detail why existing approaches for building hash functions also fail.
Although we have just described MCM in the variable-input-length setting, we note that it also works for building a dual-property compression function (i.e., a fixed-input-length function) from any CR compression function. The result could be then be used inside a multi-property-preserving domain extension transform such as EMD [2] .
A new approach to hash function design. By generically composing appropriate mixing and compressing stages, MCM allows the following separation of design tasks. First, design a function with strong guarantees of collision-resistance, inducing whatever structure is necessary. Second, design an injective function that destroys any structure present in its input. This approach is a significant departure from traditional hash function designs, in which one typically constructs a compression function that must necessarily (and simultaneously) be secure in various ways. With MCM, we instead build a hash function by designing components to achieve specific security goals. The benefits of such specialized components are immediate: MCM allows building a single hash function that has very strong CR guarantees while simultaneously being suitable for instantiating a random oracle.
Secure mixing steps. Remaining is the question of how to build mixing steps sufficient for the goals of MCM. As we've said, we require the mixing steps to be both injective and indifferentiable from a random oracle that observes injectivity. At first glance these requirements might seem overly burdensome. Can't the requirement simply be for the mixing steps to realize pseudorandom oracles, which we already know (via [12, 10, 2] ) how to build? No: while a PRO would satisfy the second constraint, albeit with some additive birthday-bound loss in concrete security, it would not at the same time suffice for MCM's crucial standard-model CR guarantee. This is because a PRO provides no guarantees of collision-resistance outside of an idealized model. In fact, simultaneously satisfying both requirements, injectivity and indifferentiability, is technically challenging.
To our knowledge, building a PRIO has never been considered before. Dodis and Puniya [16, 15] consider a similar goal, that of building random permutations from random functions, but these are invertible by construction, whereas PRIOs are not. Moreover, their proofs of security only hold for honest-but-curious adversaries. We therefore present the Tag-and-Encipher (TE) construction for realizing a PRIO (see Section 6) . It is a blockcipher mode of operation (which also employs a single trapdoor one-way permutation call) that is injective by construction. In the ideal cipher model and under the assumption of trusted setup of the trapdoor permutation, the TE construction is indifferentiable from an injective random oracle. While not particularly efficient, we view the TE construction as a proof-of-concept, and hope it fosters future efforts to build these novel primitives.
Notes on indifferentiability and composability.
In order to accomplish our task of building a hash function with both strong standard model and ideal model guarantees, we exercise the indifferentiability framework in novel ways. First, both MCM and TE are a combination of complexity-theoretic objects (the CR function H and the trapdoor permutation) and informationtheoretic objects (the idealized components). Previous indifferentiability results have been solely information-theoretic. Second, our model allows the simulator to choose the trapdoor permutation utilized in TE. These two facts imply limitations on the generic composability of our schemes. Composability refers to the guarantee that any cryptographic scheme proven secure using an ideal object remains secure when this object is replaced by a construction that is indifferentiable from it. In practice the limited composability of our constructions means that they might not be suitable for all applications of random (injective) oracles. We discuss this matter in more detail, and pose some interesting open questions raised by it, in Section 8.
Preliminaries
Notation. Let X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * . We denote the concatenation of X and Y by X || Y or simply XY . The i th bit of X is X[i] and so
. When x is an integer we write x n to represent some canonical encoding of the integer as a bit string of n bits (necessarily n ≥ ⌈log x⌉). Overloading our notation, when X is a bit string we write X n to represent the integer x encoded by X. When clear from context we will omit the subscript n. We write X| n (resp. X| n ) to represent the substring consisting of the last (resp. first) n bits of X for any n ≤ |X|. For a set S we often write S ∪ ← x, which means S ← S ∪ {x}. For sets of bit strings S and S ′ we write S || S ′ to denote the set of strings s || s ′ such that s ∈ S and s ∈ S ′ . For an algorithm f , we define Time f (µ) as the worst-case time to compute f on a message of length at most µ.
For bit string M , we write 
Cryptographic functions. A (keyed) cryptographic function F = (K, F, Dom, Rng, τ ) is a pair of algorithms, two (non-empty) sets of bit strings, and an optional parameter (the function's stretch). The key generation algorithm K outputs a key. We abuse notation slightly and write k ∈ K if k is output by K for some set of random coins. Each k ∈ K specifies a function F k : Dom → Rng.
We interchangeably write F k (·) or F (k, ·). If τ ≥ 0 is specified, this is the constant stretch and it specifies that |F k (M )| = |M | + τ for all k ∈ K and all M ∈ Dom. If the construction is keyless then K is omitted and F only takes input a message. We will write (K, F, Dom, r) if Rng = {0, 1} r and (K, F, d, r) if additionally Dom = {0, 1} d . A function might utilize primitives f 1 , . . . , f l as black-boxes for some number l ≥ 0. In this case we write F f 1 ,...,f l (k, M ) to mean computing F on key K and message M ∈ Dom using oracle access to f 1 , .
Collision resistance. Let F = (K, F, Dom, Rng) be a cryptographic function. Then we define the collision-finding advantage of an adversary A against F as
where the probability is over the random coins used by K and A.
Regularity. A function is regular if each image has an equal number of preimages. A cryptographic function F = (K, F, Dom, Rng) is regular if, for all k ∈ K, the map
That is, PreIm(k, ℓ, Y ) contains the length ℓ preimages of Y under key k. We also define the following function related to any F with Rng = {0, 1} η for η > 0:
The δ function measures how far a particular preimage set deviates from the case in which
where the maximum is taken over all choices of ℓ and Y , and we say a function family F is ∆-regular if
Intuitively, this measures the average (over keys) maximum deviation from regularity that F exhibits.
Trapdoor one-way permutations. Let F be a trapdoor permutation generator : on input 1 k it outputs a trapdoor permutation pair (f, f −1 ) where f : {0, 1} k →{0, 1} k and f −1 (f (X)) = X. We write Time f (k) or Time f −1 (k) for the the worst case time to compute f or f −1 for any (f, f −1 ) ∈ F(1 k ). The one-way advantage of an adversary A against F for security parameter k is defined by
The RSA and Rabin function families are conjectured to allow generation of secure trapdoor permutations [32, 28, 29] . We also define a generalization of the owf security, which will be useful later in our proof of the TE construction (Section 7). It captures a game in which an adversary adaptively receives multiple images, learns some of their preimages via an inversion oracle, and then attempts to invert one of the (remaining) images. Formally, we define the some-point one-way advantage of an adversary A against F for security parameter k by
The image oracle PI, when invoked (on no input), chooses a novel random point X ′ ∈ Dom, records it, and returns f (X ′ ). (By novel, we mean that the oracle samples from Dom without replacement.) The inverse oracle Inv, on input Y , returns f −1 (Y ) if Y was previously returned by PI and otherwise it returns ⊥ (i.e., B only gets to invert points already returned by PI). The adversary wins if it can find a preimage X such that Y was returned from PI and Y was not queried to Inv. The following lemma establishes that a function is secure in the spowf sense as long as it is secure in the owf sense. Its proof, by a straightforward hybrid argument, is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.1 Let k be a security parameter and F a trapdoor permutation generator. Let A be a spowf adversary against F that runs in time t and makes at most (q p , q i ) queries to its two oracles (necessarily q p ≥ q i ). Then there exists a owf adversary B such that
Moreover, B runs in time t ′ ≤ t + cq p Time f (1 k ) + cq i log q p for a small, absolute constant c.
Code-based games. We utilize code-based games [4] to formalize our indifferentiability security definitions and within our proofs. A game consists of an Initialize procedure, zero or more oracle procedures, and zero or more subroutines. All of a game's variables are global, implicitly typed, and initialized to zero for integers, everywhere ⊥ for associative arrays, the empty string for bit strings, and false for bad flags. A game is executed with an adversary A as follows. The Initialize procedure is executed, followed by running A on input the value(s) returned by Initialize. The adversary, which has its own local variables, can make calls to the game's oracle procedures, passing values from some finite domains associated with the procedures. (Subroutine procedures cannot be called by the adversary.) Eventually A halts with some output. For a game G we write A G ⇒ y to represent the event that A run with game G outputs the value y. The probability of this event occurring is over the coins used by both A and G. Let
for any adversary A and games G, H.
Ideal ciphers. For integers k, n > 0, a blockcipher E: {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n →{0, 1} n is a function for which
An ideal cipher is a blockcipher uniformly selected from BC(k, n), the space of all blockciphers with k-bit keys and n-bit blocksize. In the ideal cipher model, both an ideal cipher E and its inverse are given to all parties as oracles.
Random functions and random injections. Let Dom, Rng ⊆ {0, 1} * . Recall that a function
(Necessarily for an injection |Dom| ≤ |Rng|.) For simplicity, we only consider injections with constant stretch τ ≥ 0: if X ∈ Dom then |f (X)| = |X| + τ . The following subroutines implement a random function, a random function with constant stretch, and a random injection with constant stretch.
The tables F and I are initially everywhere set to ⊥ and the table R is initially everywhere ∅. The argument i will be used to distinguish between different instances of random functions (resp. in-
Game PRIO F,S Figure 2 : Games CONS, PRO, and PRIO used to define indifferentiability for cryptographic functions. Here P i is defined for all i ∈ [1 .. l] where l is the number of (idealizable) primitives used by the cryptographic function C. jections). We will write
to identify a subroutine that works as specified above, sometimes omitting (i, ·) when only discussing a single instance. We will write RF Dom,r if Rng = {0, 1} r and RI PROs and PRIOs. The notion of indifferentiability [22] is a generalization of conventional indistinguishability [17] . It facilitates reasoning about the ability of constructions to emulate some idealized functionality (e.g., a random oracle) in settings where the construction itself utilizes public, idealized components (e.g., an ideal cipher or fixed-input-length (FIL) random oracle). We adapt the formalization of indifferentiability from [12, 2] (to a code-based games setting) to formalize definitions of security for pseudorandom oracles and pseudorandom injective oracles.
A simulator S = (SI, S 1 , . . . , S l ) is a tuple of game subroutines. The (optional) routine SI will be used for initialization (whenever omitted, it is implicitly instantiated with a no-op). Routines S 1 , . . . , S l implement various oracle functionalities. Note that a simulator S will be used within a game, and thus maintains state across oracle calls. Moreover, each subroutine's variables (being global) are accessible by the other subroutines. Note however, that we require that S be defined independently of any particular game it is used within, meaning that it cannot directly access the rest of the enclosing game's variables.
Let F = (K, F, Dom, Rng, τ ) be a cryptographic function and S = (SI, S 1 , . . . , S l ) be a simulator. We assume that the number of (black-box) primitives used by F and the number of oracles implemented by S are equal (to l). Figure 2 shows the games CONS and PRO. These games expose l + 1 oracles. We define the pro advantage of an adversary A against F by
Similarly we define the prio advantage of an adversary A against F by
where game PRIO is defined in Figure 2 . Note that here the simulator is allowed to choose the key for the cryptographic function. This weakening of the security model (as compared to having the initialization choose it) is necessary for our proof of the TE construction in Section 7.
The MCM Construction
Fix numbers η > 0 and τ ≥ 0 and
be an injective cryptographic function mapping, with stretch τ , points in M to points in M H . Let E 2 = (K 2 , E 2 , η, η + τ, τ ) be an injective cryptographic function mapping, with stretch τ , points in {0, 1} η to points in {0,
is the construction that works as follows. The key generation algorithm K runs k 1
Overloading our notation, if
is the cryptographic function with key generation algorithm equivalent to that of H and hashing defined by
where computation is done using oracle access to I 1 and I 2 . Notice that τ is also the number of bits beyond η needed to hold an MCM hash value. Ideally τ = 0, in which case E 2 would necessarily be a permutation. We have the following theorem, which states that H inherits the collision-resistance of H.
Let A be an adversary that runs in time t and outputs messages each of length at most µ. Then there exists an adversary B such that
where B runs in time t ′ ≤ t + 2(cµ + Time E 1 (µ)) for an absolute constant c.
Proof: Let B be the adversary that behaves as follows. On input key k it runs k 1
, and runs A(K). Adversary A outputs two messages (X, X ′ ).
where c is an absolute constant.
We point out that similar theorems can be given for several other hash function properties, including target collision-resistance (TCR, or eSec), preimage resistance, and always preimage resistance (aPre) [34] 2 . The next theorem captures that MCM is a PRO if both E 1 and E 2 are modeled as random injections.
Let ν be the minimal message length in M. Let A be an adversary that runs in time t and makes at most (q 0 , q 1 , q 2 ) queries to its three oracles with the maximal query length being µ bits. Let q = q 0 + q 1 + q 2 . Then there exists an adversary B such that
where the simulator S is specified in Figure 3 . Let c be an absolute constant. Then, S runs in time t S ≤ cµ(q 1 Time H (µ) + (q 1 + q 2 ) log q 1 ) and makes at most min{q 1 , q 2 } oracle queries. Adversary B runs in time at most t B ≤ t + c ′ µ(qTime H (µ) + q log q).
As long as E 1 and E 2 are PRIOs we can securely replace them by actual random injections (as per the composition theorem of [22] , though see Section 8). Then, Theorem 3.2 states that no adversary can differentiate between a random oracle and the construction unless it is given sufficient time to break the collision-resistance of H, allowed to make approximately 2 (min{η,ν+τ })/2 queries, or H is not sufficiently close to regular for all but a negligible fraction of the keys. Here ν could in fact be small, since this is the minimal message length in the domain of our hash function (and we'd certainly want to include short messages). However, in practice, H will have some minimal message length ν H (e.g., the blocksize of an underlying compression function) to which short messages would necessarily be padded anyway. Thus, H can 'aggressively' pad short strings to a minimal length ν = ν H − τ , recovering our security guarantee. The proof of Theorem 3.2 is given in Section 5.
Insecurity of Other Approaches
Here we give just a brief investigation of several alternative approaches to MCM. In all cases, either the resulting object is not provably collision-resistant in the standard model or not provably a PRO in an ideal model.
Using existing blockcipher-based hash functions. Let E: {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher, modeled as ideal. Let f be a 2n-bit to n-bit compression function. Fix some suitable domain extension transform, for example Merkle-Damgård with a prefix-free encoding. That is
, and g: {0, 1} * →({0, 1} n ) + is a prefix-free padding function. For simplicity let g(M ) simply split M into blocks of n − 1 bits (M having been appropriately padded), and then appending a zero to each block except the last and appending a one to the last block. If f is one of the twenty group-1/2 schemes from [5] , then H is collision-resistant in the ideal cipher model. Moreover, a recent paper by Chang et al. [10] shows that sixteen of these twenty yield a PRO H. However as soon as one leaves the ideal cipher model, H is not provably CR. For example let E ′ be the blockcipher defined as follows:
where, now, E is no longer ideal. Let
We can see that an adversary can trivially find collisions against H built using E ′ . This is true even though E ′ is a good pseudorandom permutation (the usual standard model security property of blockciphers) whenever E is also. 3 Removing injectivity requirements. If either E 1 or E 2 are not injective, then the MCM construction loses its provable collision-resistance. Assuming they are built using blockciphers (as we suggest), then one can, in spirit similar to the counter-example above, construct a collision resistant function H ′ and a good PRP E ′ that, when utilized in MCM, would lead to a trivial collision. Note that one might imagine replacing E 1 and E 2 with objects that are not injective, yet have some other standard model guarantees to ensure provable collision-resistance in MCM. Short of establishing their collision-resistance, its not clear what properties could achieve this goal. Additionally, this approach would seem to violate the separation of design tasks intrinsic to the MCM approach.
Omitting E 1 from MCM. If one omits the first "mixing" step E 1 of MCM, then the construction no longer results in a PRO. This result is essentially equivalent to the Coron et al. insecurity result regarding the composition of a CR and one-way function H with a random oracle [12] , but we state a version of it here for completeness. Let H = CM[H, I 2 ] be this modified construction for
). Now we show that H is easily differentiable from a true random oracle R = RF M H ,η+τ . Let A be an adversary that queries it's first oracle on a uniformly selected message M ∈ M H of some length ℓ. Let the returned value be C. Now the adversary queries its second oracle (being either I 2 or a simulator) on H K (M ). Let the returned value be C ′ . If C = C ′ then A returns one, guessing that it's interacting with the construction. Otherwise it returns zero, guessing that it's interacting with the true random oracle. We have that Pr A H,I 2 ⇒1 = 1. On the other hand, Pr A R,S ⇒1 is bounded by the advantage of another adversary (related to the simulator) in breaking the one-wayness of H; essentially, the simulator is unable to query R on M without inverting H K (M ).
Allowing E 1 , E 2 to be invertible. Our formalization of PRIOs ensure that constructions meeting the goal are not invertible. Thus, objects that are invertible do not meet the goal. It remains an open question whether MCM is, in fact, secure under easy-to-invert mixing steps.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
The simulator. Let R = RF M,η+τ (0, ·) be a random oracle. Figure 3 depicts a simulator S = (SI, S 1 , S 2 ). The initialization subroutine SI just records the key for H. The subroutine S 1 implements a random injection for bit strings in M. The subroutine S 2 , when queried on bit string Y ∈ {0, 1} η , checks if S 1 already maps a string M to a preimage of Y under H k . If such an M exists, then the simulator queries R on M and the output of S 2 (Y ) is programmed to match the value returned by R. Otherwise, a random string of length η + τ is returned.
We have that S makes at most min{q 1 , q 2 } queries to its oracle when run in conjunction with any pro adversary making at most (q 0 , q 1 , q 2 ) queries to its oracles. (We take the minimum because the simulator will query its oracle only when two queries by the adversary to its second and third oracles are associated appropriately.) The simulator's S 1 subroutine requires time proportional to Time H (µ) + log q 1 . (This is the time needed to compute H k , to implement the random injection, and the time to build the YtoM table.) The simulator's S 2 subroutine requires time proportional to log q 1 (this is the time needed to do lookups in YtoM). Thus, t S ≤ cµ(Time H (µ) · q 1 + (q 1 + q 2 ) log q 1 ) for c a small, absolute constant.
The proof. The proof is captured by two main lemmas. The first lets us simplify the simulator by showing that we can focus on a certain class of adversaries without loss of generality. The second collisions in the twenty functions [5] trivial. lemma bounds the probability of success of any pro-adversary in this class against the simplified simulator.
Let the simplified simulator SS = (SSI, SS 1 , SS 2 ) be defined as shown in Figure 3 . Here SS 1 implements a random injection and SS 2 always returns a string of random bits. (Recall that pointless queries are disallowed, so SS 2 need not perform consistency checks.) Note that the key received by the simulator in SSI is never actually used, so we could technically dispense with SSI completely.
Let A be any pro adversary against H that makes at mostueries. Consider the query transcript (ty 1 , Q 1 , R 1 ) A , . . . , (ty t , Q t , R t ) A that results from running A within game CONS H or PRO H,S . For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, ty i ∈ {0, 1, 2} specifies to which oracle (numbered left to right) the ith query was made, the query being Q i ∈ M ∪ {0, 1} ν , with response R i ∈ M H ∪ {0, 1} ν+τ . We show that it is sufficient to consider an adversary A which is restricted in the types of oracle queries it makes. Let a construction-respecting adversary be such that the transcript resulting in its interaction with any triple of oracles does not have entries (1, Q i , R i ) and (2, Q j , R j ) with i < j and Q j = H k (R i ). In particular, this means that such an adversary never queries the second oracle on a value, gets the response, hashes it with H k , and then queries the third oracle on the resulting value. Such a pair of queries will be called construction disrespecting.
Lemma 5.1 Let A be a pro adversary against H running in time at most t and making at mostueries to all of its oracles with the combined length of all queries at most µ. Then there exists a construction-respecting adversary B such that
where B runs in time at most t B ≤ t + cµ(q · Time H (µ) + q log q) and makes at mostueries.
Proof:
We construct an adversary B that runs A and incorporates the checks done by simulator S for various oracle queries. Namely let B, given oracles O ′ 0 , P ′ 1 , P ′ 2 and run on input k, work as follows. It runs A(k) and answer A's oracle queries as follows.
query P 1 (M ): 
For (2) we have by construction that both A and B behave identically until A induces a constructiondisrespecting pair of queries. Consider the first such pair made by A, letting the resulting transcript entries be (1, Q i , R i ) A and (2, H k (R i ), R j ) A where i < j. If A is interacting with the oracles (H, I 1 , I 2 ) in game CONS H , then it receives responses R i = I 1 (Q i ) and
If, on the other hand, A is running within B (which in turn has the same oracles (H, I 1 , I 2 )), then instead of the query (2, H k (R i ), R j ) A , the transcript will have an entry (0, Q j , R ′ j ) B in its place. Here, Q j = Q i and, by the construction of MCM, R ′ j = I 2 (H k (I 1 (Q i ))). Therefore in both cases A receives identically distributed oracle responses. Repeating this reasoning for each pair of construction-disrespecting queries justifies (2).
For (3) we first show that the probability that A PRO H,S ⇒ 1 is equal to the probability that B PRO H,S ⇒ 1. The argument is similar to the one just given. In short, consider a pair of construction-disrespecting queries and their transcript entries (1,
If A is interacting with (R, S 1 , S 2 ) it receives responses R i computed by RI * M,τ (1, Q i ) and R j = R(Q i ) (because the conditional in S 2 will evaluate to true for such a query). If A is running within B, then B replaces (2, H k (R i ), R j ) A with (0, Q j , R j ) B where Q j = Q i and R j = R(Q i ). Thus the events occur with the same probability. Now we note that, for any construction-respecting adversary B, execution of B PRO H,S never causes the conditional statement in S 2 to evaluate to true. Thus we can replace S with SS, justifying (3). Lemma 5.2 Let A be a construction-respecting pro adversary against H running in time at most t and making at most (q 0 , q 1 , q 2 ) queries to its oracles with the maximum query length being µ bits. Then there exists a cr adversary B such that
where B runs in time at most t B ≤ t + cµ(q 0 · Time H (µ) + (q 0 + q 1 ) log(q 0 + q 1 ) + q 0 log q 0 + q 2 ).
Proof: First we lift the injectivity constraint of the third oracle, i.e. I 2 , in game CONS H , incurring a standard birthday-bound loss. That is let CONS ′ H be the game that is the same as CONS H except that oracle P 2 now implements a random function RF η,η+τ (2, ·). Then,
where here the numerator of the last term is the maximum number of times a range point of I 2 is sampled. Game G0 (Figure 4 , boxed statements included) implements CONS ′ H . The table F is used to build the random function RF η,η+τ (2, ·). (The consistency checks on lines 014 and 033 ensure that game G0 implements a random function for the third oracle.) The random injection I 1 is implemented directly using a subroutine RI * M,τ (1, ·) called on lines 011 and 021. This justifies that
procedure Initialize Game G1 (Figure 4 , boxed statements omitted) is exactly like G0 but with the boxed statements removed. In particular this means that O 0 and P 2 always return random bits. Notice that queries to O 0 can determine points under the injection on line 011 (something not possible via a query to the oracle R); however, the adversary learns nothing about these points and therefore they appear fresh if later returned by an P 1 query. Similarly, O 0 queries can set values in the table F on line 015, but these values do not impact any later random variables in the game (because of the boxed statements are omitted in game G1). Thus, G1 implements the oracles (R, SS 1 , SS 2 ), i.e. game PRO H,SS , and so
The games are also identical-until-bad and so the fundamental lemma of game-playing [4] , together with (5), (6) , and (7), justifies
Game G2, shown in Figure 4 , modifies game G1 in the following ways. The random sampling of C j in O 0 and P 2 are deferred until the end of the procedures. Instead of filling the table F with values, positions are just marked with a 1 to represent having been defined. It is clear that
Game G3 ( Figure 4 , boxed statements included and barred statements omitted) differs from G2 in that we replace bad with two distinct flags bad1 and bad2. The former is set when two Y j values defined in O 0 collide (line 313). The latter is set if a Y j value in O 0 and a Y j value in P 2 collide (lines 314 and 331) or if a Y j value chosen in P 1 collides with a Y j previously chosen in P 2 (line 323). We have that if executing A G2 on a sequence of random coins leads to bad being set, then executing A G3 on the same random coins will necessarily lead to either bad1 or bad2 being set.
(Note that more sequences of random coins could result in A G3 setting one of the two flags, because of the line 323.) Thus
We can bound the probability of bad1 being set as follows. We build an adversary B which breaks the collision-resistance of H whenever bad1 is set in G3, meaning
Let B be the adversary that, on input k, runs A(k) and answers A's oracle queries as in G3. If ever two values
To justify (12) , first note that the distributions of random variables in the process k $ ← K H ; B(k) and in A G3 are the same. Suppose B forces bad1 to be set. Then two values Y i and Y j collide for some i = j. The fact that A never makes pointless queries implies that the corresponding queries M i and M j made to O 0 by A are not equal. In turn the injectivity of RI * M,τ (1, ·) gives that X i = X j . To bound the probability of bad2 being set, we first perform one more game transition. Game G4 (Figure 4 , boxed statements replaced by barred statements) behaves exactly like G3 except we remove the injectivity of the first mixing step. We relate the games G3 and G4 by the inequality
which can be justified by a simple birthday argument where q 1 + q 2 is the maximum number of range points sampled by RI * M,τ (1, ·) in G3. Now we bound the probability that bad2 is set in G4. We first argue that the probability of bad2 being set is unrelated to the adaptivity of A and the choice of messages queried by A to P 2 . If bad2 is set on line 314 or 323, it is because of a fresh random choice of Y about which the adversary knows nothing. If bad2 is set on line 331, then the adversarially-chosen value Y collides with a value Y previously chosen. However, because A is construction-respecting it has no information about Y at the time of the P 2 query. (The only way to learn such a point would be to query P 1 before the bad2-setting query to P 2 .). Thus even in this case it's a fresh random value.
We can therefore bound the probability of bad2 being set in G4 by the probability of success in the following combinatorial game. Pick a key k $ ← K H . Fix any q 3 points y 1 , . . . , y q 3 from {0, 1} ν . Let Y = {y 1 , . . . , y q 3 }. Fix any q 1 + q 2 numbers l 1 , . . . , l q 1 +q 2 such that {0,
The combinatorial game is "successful" if there exists i, j such that H k (X i ) = y j . In terms of our proof, A gets to pick the (optimal) y values and l values and these will be its P 2 queries and the lengths of it's O 0 and P 1 queries, respectively. We have that
Combining the inequality above with (8) , (9), (10), (11), (12) , and (13) implies equation (4), the advantage relation given in Lemma 5.2.
To finish the proof of the lemma, we analyze the resources used by the adversary B. Adversary B runs A G3 . Note, however, that lines 314, 315, 323, 331, and 332 of G3 can be omitted since these only deal with setting bad2. Lines 311 and 321 (implementing the random injection) require at most (q 0 + q 1 ) log(q 0 + q 1 ) time since q 0 + q 1 points are sampled. Line 312 requires at most q 0 · Time H (µ) time over the course of the game. Line 313 will require at most q 0 log q 0 time. Thus, t B ≤ t + cµ(q 0 · Time H (µ) + (q 0 + q 1 ) log(q 0 + q 1 ) + q 0 log q 0 + q 2 ) for a small, absolute constant c.
Secure Mixing Steps: the TE Construction
We now turn to showing the feasibility of instantiating the mixing steps E 1 and E 2 starting from blockciphers. We note that our eventual construction also works starting from a suitable fixedinput-length random oracle. This would have slight theoretical benefits because it is unknown whether the ROM and ICM are equivalent [16] . However, one might want to utilize blockciphers and the proofs are only rendered more complex when considering invertible components, thus we stick to the former.
We specify a construction that is a PRIO, i.e. indifferentiable from a random injection. Under the composability guarantees of the indifferentiability framework [22] (though see Section 8), the security of schemes (e.g., MCM) proven secure while modeling components as ideal injections remains when these objects are replaced by PRIOs.
At first glance the notion of a PRIO might appear to be essentially equivalent to that of a pseudorandom oracle. The distinction is somewhat analogous to the difference between PRPs and PRFs. Indeed, random injections and random functions behave similarly up to a birthday-bound, which implies that any PRIO is a good PRO and vice versa. But the more important (and subtle) concern is that the closeness of the definitions might lead one to the conclusion that there are trivial constructions for our mixing steps, utilizing any PRO. However, this would be entirely insufficient for our application because, while a PRO appears injective with high probability, it is not necessarily injective by construction. Once we step outside of idealized models we would then have a standard model object that does not suffice for the collision-resistance guarantee of Section 3. So for clarity of exposition and analysis, we found it useful to draw a distinction between the two objects.
Building a PRIO that is injective by construction from a blockcipher (modeled as ideal) proves a challenging task. Our object must be publically computable, so no secret keys are allowed. A minimum intuitive security requirement for the object is that the outputs resulting from applying it to two messages that differ in a single bit must appear to have been chosen independently at random, even when adversaries have direct access to the underlying blockcipher. This rules out the straightforward use of existing blockcipher modes of operation, such as CBC, with a public key and fixed IV or even the more complex variable-length enciphering schemes (e.g. [20, 19, 30, 18] ).
The TE construction. Our construction utilizes two blockciphers and a trapdoor one-way permutation. Note that in the ideal cipher model one can easily derive two ciphers from a single cipherÊ at the cost of one bit of keying material: E(K, M ) ≡Ê(1 || K, M ) and E ′ (K, M ) ≡ E(0 || K, M ). For simplicity then we assume access to two ciphers E: {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n →{0, 1} n and E ′ : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n →{0, 1} n . The cipher E will be used in a blockcipher mode much like CTR mode encryption. The cipher E ′ will be utilized to build a function F for generating tags that will be (with high probability) unique to each input message. A message's tag then serves as algorithm E f (M ): the key for a CTR-mode-like enciphering step. In fact our function F will realize a blockcipherbased construction of a pseudorandom oracle, originally suggested in [12] and proven secure in [10] . Finally, a trapdoor one-way permutation f is applied to the tag value, the result being the first portion of the output. This step ensures the injectivity of the construction, while the one-wayness "hides" the tag. We will require the trapdoor property in the proof.
Let F be a trapdoor permutation generator. Then we define the cryptographic function TE[E, F] = (F f , E, M, M + , k) as follows. The algorithm F f runs (f, f −1 ) $ ← F(1 k ) and outputs f . The algorithm E f and a realization of F are specified in Figure 5 . Used there is a prefix-free padding function PadPF: {0, 1} * →({0, 1} n ) + . This means that for any two messages M, M ′ ∈ {0, 1} * with |M | = |M ′ | the string PadPF(M ) is not a prefix of PadPF(M ′ ). (Such functions are simple, one example is to unambiguously pad M to sequence of n − 1 bit blocks. Then append a zero to all the blocks except the last, to which a one is appended.) Note that the security of TE relies on adversaries not knowing f −1 . 4 If E $ ← BC(k, n) and F = RF M,k , we write E E,F (M ) to denote computing E on message M using oracle access to E and F.
The security of TE. First we point out that our realization of F above is a PRO, based on the proof in [10] . The composability guarantees of the indifferentiability framework established in [22] then allow us to just treat F as a random oracle. As per the definition in Section 2, we allow the simulator in game PRIO to choose the trapdoor one-way permutation f used in TE. Namely, the Figure 6 : The simulator S = (SI, S E , S D , S F ) used in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Initialize procedure of PRIO E,S (for some simulator S = (SI, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 )) runs SI and returns its return value. In game CONS E , Initialize directly runs (f, f −1 ) $ ← F(1 k ) and returns f . Our simulator is shown in Figure 6 , where I = RI * M,k . Recall that the notation M ← BC(k, n) be an ideal cipher with inverse D, let F = RF M,k , and let F be a trapdoor permutation generator. Let TE[E, F] = (F f , E, M, M + , k) be as specified above. Let A be an adversary that asks at most (q 0 , q 1 , q 2 , q 3 ) oracle queries, each of length at most µ bits, and runs in time at most t. Then there exists an adversary B such that
where σ = ⌈µ/n⌉. Let q = q 0 + q 1 + q 2 + q 3 . The simulator S, defined in Figure 6 , runs in time at most t S ≤ cµ(q 3 Time f −1 (1 k ) + q log q) for some absolute constant c and makes q 3 queries to its oracle. Adversary B runs in time t ′ ≤ t + c ′ µ((q 1 + q 2 )Time f (1 k ) + q log q) for some absolute constant c ′ and makes at most (q 0 + q 3 , q 3 ) queries to its first oracle and second oracles respectively.
A proof of the theorem is provided in Section 7, here we just provide a brief proof sketch. An adversary is given either oracles implementing the tuple of algorithms (E, E, D, F) or (I, S E , S D , S F ) where I = RI * M,k . Recall that D is the oracle implementing the inverse of E. Intuitively the structure of TE ensures that an adversary, attempting to discover information about the tag and via it the random pad created for some message M , must reveal M to the simulator (by querying the fourth oracle). Knowing M , the simulator can 'program' the random pad to be consistent with output of the ideal injection I.
The simulator will fail if either of two events occurs. The first event corresponds to when two tags collide in the course of simulating the construction. If this happens the CTR mode must generate the same pad, and no longer hides relationships between input and output bits. Such an event will occur with low probability because F is a RO. The second kind of event is if the adversary infers a tag value without utilizing its fourth oracle (F or S F ). If it can do so, then it can query its second (E or S E ) or third oracle (D or S D ) before the simulator knows how the responses should be chosen. This event should happen with low probability because it requires the adversary inverts f on some image returned as the first k bits of a query to the first oracle. Since neither event occurs with high probability, we achieve a bound on the adversary's ability to differentiate the two sets of oracles.
Discussion. One might wonder if we can dispense with the one way permutation. In fact it is requisite: omitting it would result in a construction easily differentiable from a random injective oracle. An adversary could simply query its first oracle on a random message M 1 , receiving T || Y 1 . Then the adversary could query its third oracle (either D or S D ) on (T, Y 1 ). At this point the simulator has no knowledge about M 1 and will therefore only respond correctly with low probability.
The TE construction is a proof-of-concept: it is the first object to achieve our new goal of being simultaneously constructively injective and indifferentiable from a random injection. On the other hand it has several drawbacks when considering it for practical use. It is length-increasing (outputs are larger than the inputs by at least the number of key bits of the underlying blockcipher). This means that when utilized in MCM the output hash values will be larger compared to the outputs of the provably CR function H. Further, the construction requires two passes over the data and the application of a trapdoor permutation. In settings where speed is not essential (e.g., contract signing), the extra expense of using TE over that already incurred by hashing with a standardmodel, provably collision-resistant function H might not be prohibitive. All this said, the TE construction does show that the MCM approach is feasible. We hope that future research will surface improvements.
7 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Overview. Our proof is broken down into several lemmas. Lemma 7.1 shows how to move the CONS E game closer to the PRIO E,S game, without significant loss. Lemma 7.2 works in the other direction, modifying the PRIO E,S game to move it closer to CONS E . These lemmas culminate in showing that the PRIO security experiment is captured by the difference between two identicaluntil-bad games G0 and G1. After applying the fundamental lemma of game-playing [4] , the rest of the proof involves bounding the probability that bad is set in these games. This last is captured by Lemma 7.3, and involves several more game transitions from G1 to a setting in which one can show that bad is set only if the adversary can invert f on some point. (Recall that in Section 2 we discuss that a one-way function is also a some-point one-way function.)
For the rest of this section, let k ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0 be numbers. Let A be a prio adversary against
Assume A makes at most (q 0 , q 1 , q 2 , q 3 ) queries to its four oracles. Let µ be the maximal length of message queried by A and define σ = ⌈µ/n⌉. The simulator S = (SI, S E , S D , S F ) is defined in Figure 6 .
We first state the separate lemmas and use them to conclude, then prove each in turn.
The above lemmas, combined with the fact that we can apply the fundamental lemma of gameplaying [4] due to G0 and G1 being identical-until-bad, give that
The next lemma captures the bulk of the proof.
Lemma 7.3
There exists a spowf adversary B such that
and B runs in time t ′ ≤ t + cµ((q 1 + q 2 )Time F (1 k ) + q log q) and makes at most q 0 + q 3 queries to its PI oracle and at most q 3 queries to its Inv oracle.
Combining this last lemma with (14) implies Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Lemma 7.1
We specify a sequence of games R0
which together imply the lemma statement. The first four games are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 and game G0 is shown in Figure 10 . In all games we omit explicitly showing an Initialize procedure; in every game it just computes (f, f −1 ) $ ← F and returns f . We now discuss the game transitions to justify the equations above.
Game R0 implements CONS E . The game uses two tables E and D to facilitate implementing an ideal cipher and a table F to facilitate implementating a random oracle. Table I is built, but never used in R0 since pointless queries are disallowed. (It will be useful in future games). We have justified (15) .
Game R1 is the same as R0 except that we omit the boxed statements, which in game R0 were used to ensure that the ideal cipher implementation behaves as a family of permutations. In R1, instead, domain or range points could be allowed to collide. A standard birthday-bound argument then justifies (16) . (The boxed statements only execute should a randomly selected value collide with some small number of previously defined values.)
Game R2 is the same as R1, just explicitly omitting the conditionals and associated boxed statements from game R1. Game R3 drops updating D in two places. This does not affect the game execution because the values in D are only used in P 2 and the restriction against pointless queries means that P 2 will never be queried on a K, U such that D[K, U ] was defined in a previous query to P 1 or P 2 . We have justified (17) .
Game R4 changes handling of P 3 queries: instead of directly sampling and recording in F, the oracle now queries O 0 on M to retrieve Y , then the correct value is returned. On the other hand, R4 differs from R3 in that a query to P 3 on M might set several random variables that were not set for such a query in R3 (e.g., values in E). However, the adversary learns nothing about these values until it makes a O 0 (M ) or P 1 query, and so choosing them in response to the earlier query is just eager sampling. The change is therefore conservative, meaning Adv(A R3 , A R4 ) = 0.
Game R5 makes two conservative changes to R4. First, the consistency checks for selection of T in O 0 are dropped. This check is now redundant because P 3 no longer adds entries to F separately and so consistency is established by the check against I at the beginning of the O 0 procedure. Second, R5 adds extra consistency checks at the beginning of P 1 and P 2 . This is facilitated by adding the tables EE and DD, which have entries added in P 3 . We argue that the modifications to P 1 and P 2 does not change the game's behavior. If EE[K, C] does not equal bottom when handling a query P 1 (K, C), then E[K, C] is set to EE[K, C]. This is because for EE[K, C] to be set, P 3 must have been called, and, in turn, this ensures that O 0 was executed. Moreover, the value EE[K, C] = M i ⊕ Y i = P i is exactly the value stored in E in O 0 . A similar argument establishes that DD[K, U ] being set coincides with a consistent value already stored in D[K, U ]. These changes therefore do not change the behavior of the game, and so Adv(A R4 , A R5 ) = 0. We have justified (18) .
Game G0 is game R5 but with a flag bad that can be set. The flag does not otherwise affect the execution of the game, and so Adv(A R3 , A G0 ) = 0. We have justified (19).
Proof of Lemma 7.2
We specify a sequence of games I0 −→ I1 −→ G1 such that
which together imply the lemma statement. Games I0 and I1 are shown in Figure 9 . Game G1 is shown in Figure 10 . Procedure Initialize is not shown, in all games it simply generates (f, f −1 ) $ ← F(1 k ) and returns f . We now discuss each game in turn to justify Equations (20) and (21) .
In game I0 procedure O 0 implements a random function while P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 implement the S E , S D , and S F subroutines of the simulator S = (SI, S E , S D , S F ). Here I0 does not explicitly include SI, instead we allow the procedures access to f −1 as if SI was used. The only distinction, then, between I0 and PRIO E,S is that O 0 is a random function in the former and a random injection in the latter. Game I0 also includes extra book-keeping code such asthe table E, but this does not affect the implemented functionality. The PRP/PRF switching lemma [4] implies (20) , since at most q 0 + q 3 invocations of O 0 occur, meaning that many bit strings of length at least k + 1 bits are sampled.
Game I1 modifies the way game I0 implements O 0 . Nevertheless, the values returned by O 0 in I1 are randomly chosen strings of length k + |M | for any message M queried. To see this, note that T is selected uniformly, and by the permutivity of f this means f (T ) inherits this distribution. Each Y i value is equal to P i ⊕ M i where P i is chosen randomly, so each Y i value is a random bit string. We have justified that Adv(A I0 , A I1 ) = 0.
Game G1 is game I1 but with a flag bad that might be set. The flag does not modify any other variables, and otherwise the games are identical. We have justified (21).
Proof of Lemma 7.3
We proceed through a sequence of games G1 −→ G2 −→ G3 −→ G4 −→ G5 and build from game G5 a spowf adversary B. The games are shown in Figures 10 and 11 and B is shown in Figure 12 . Figure 9 : Games I0 and I1.
We will justify that Pr A G1 sets bad = Pr A G2 sets bad
These equations (along with the analysis of B's running time below) imply Lemma 7.3. We discuss each game transition in turn and then B to justify equations (22) through (26) . Game G2 is the same as G1 except that instead of recording points in E based on T or K, points are recorded via f (T ) and f (K). Since f is a permutation this does not change the implemented functionality, justifying (22) . Game G3 (boxed statements are omitted) adds a set T for recording choices of T in O 0 and a flag bad2 that is set if two values T are chosen to be the same value in the course of the game. The functionality of the oracle is not modified, however, leading to equality Figure 10 : Games G0 (boxed statements included), G1 (boxed statements omitted), and G2. (23) . Game G4 (boxed statements included) restricts sampling of T to not allow such duplicates. We have that Pr A G3 sets bad − Pr A G4 sets bad ≤ Pr A G4 sets bad2 (27) by the fact that G3 and G4 are identical-until-bad2 and the fundamental lemma of game-playing [4] . At most q 0 + q 3 values are added to T in G4. The probability that any pair of such points collides is at most 1/2 k , so
Combining the above with (27) justifies (24) . Game G5 just samples from {0, 1} k \T directly when Figure 11 : Games G3 (boxed statement omitted), G4 (boxed statement included), and G5.
choosing T values in O 0 . This conservative change implements the same functionality as in G4, which justifies (25) .
Adversary B works just like A G5 except no initialize procedure is used (instead, B receives the spowf experiment's choice of f ); O 0 is handled using the PI oracle provided to B; and P 3 uses the Inv oracle provided to B to invert some image points. Several observations are in order about the behavior of B. First, every point queried to Inv necessarily is a value returned by PI since Y j 0 is returned by O 0 . Second, if bad is set, then (i) the value P[Φ] output by B is the preimage of an image Φ returned by PI and (ii) B never queried Φ to Inv.
To justify (i) we observe that bad is set only in two cases. The first occurs when an execution of O 0 set a point E[Φ, i n ] and a query to P 1 was made with K such that f (K) = Φ. The second occurs when an execution of O 0 set a point D[Φ, P i ] and a query to P 2 was made with K such that f (K) = Φ. In these two cases, the value output must be a preimage of a value Φ returned by PI. (Other possible cases will not lead to bad being set. Pointless queries disallow bad being set due to two queries to P 1 , or to P 2 . That PI samples without replacement means bad cannot be due to two executions of O 0 .)
To justify (ii), we note that no value P[Φ] is ever recorded after a query Inv(Y 0 ) for Y 0 = Φ. This is so because of the checks against EE and DD in the code of P 1 and P 2 . By justifying (i) and (ii) we have justified (26) .
The running time of B is at most the time to run A plus overhead proportional to (q 1 + q 2 )Time f (k) + q log q where q = q 0 + q 1 + q 2 + q 3 . The log q factor accounts for the time to implement the tables P, E, D, EE, and DD. Thus, t ′ ≤ t + cµ((q 1 + q 2 )Time f (k) + q log q) where µ is the longest message queried by A and c is a small, absolute constant. Moreover, B makes q 0 + q 3 queries to its PI oracle and makes q 3 queries to its Inv oracle.
Composability Limitations and Open Problems
Recall that the key benefit of indifferentiability results is the guarantee of composability, as discussed in depth in [22] . For example, a cryptographic scheme E proven secure when utilizing a (monolithic) random oracle R remains secure if the random oracle is replaced by a PRO construction C. When we say "remains secure" we mean that the existence of an adversary breaking the security of E R implies the existence of an adversary that breaks the security of E C . This means we can safely argue about the security of E C in two steps: show that C is indifferentiable from R and then that E R is secure. Enabling this approach is a significant benefit of simulation-based definitions (the UC framework is another example [7] ). Our results also allow for secure composition, but with important (and perhaps subtle) qualifications.
First, we note that both Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 6.1 differ from previous indifferentiability results because they are complexity-theoretic in nature. Specifically, the indifferentiability of MCM from a random oracle (Theorem 3.2) relies on an adversary's inability to find collisions under H. The indifferentiability of TE from a random injection (Theorem 6.1) relies on an adversary's inability to invert the trapdoor permutation f . We must bound the computational power of the adversary in both results, since an unbounded adversary can always find collisions against H or invert f . This means that E MCM , for example, is secure only against computationally-bounded adversaries, even if E R is information-theoretically secure. This is a problem for random-oracle-based constructions E that require information-theoretic security (see, e.g. [6] ).
Second, Theorem 6.1 relies on a simulator that knows the trapdoor of the one-way permutation (i.e., it gets to control generation of the permutation). Effectively then, instantiating TE requires a trusted party to publish a description of f , which can be considered a common reference string (CRS). We allow the simulator to choose the CRS in the proof. Recent results by Pass and Canetti et al. [25, 8] call into question the (wide) use of such powerful simulators, in that composability of some security properties might be lost. For example, Pass discusses how deniability of noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs (the prover can assert that he never even proved a statement) does not hold if the proof relies on the zero-knowledge simulator choosing the CRS [25] . Indeed interpreting the composability theorem for the indifferentiability framework [22, Thm. 1] in the context of TGen implies that some security properties (e.g., deniability) of constructions using TE will not hold in settings where other parties are allowed to know f .
These subtle nuances of our results lead to a host of provocative open questions. What other properties, beyond deniability, are compromised by the weak composability guarantees of TE? Is it (im)possible to build PRIOs without relying on such strong simulators? Can we strengthen the MCM security result, or find other constructions, that simultaneously are provably CR and yet have information-theoretic indifferentiability from a RO?
A Proof of Lemma 2.1
Let k be a security parameter and F be trapdoor permutation generator and A be an spowf adversary against F that makes exactlyueries to its PI oracle. Then we construct a owf adversary B against F that works as shown below. Note that A's environment, as simulated by B, is exactly that of the spowf experiment unless B aborts early (outputs X or ⊥). Informally, if the choice r is "correct", then A won't force B to halt with output ⊥ (since by the rules of the spowf game, A cannot query to Inv the image point it will invert) and otherwise B outputs the preimage of Y * . A standard argument rigorously gives this, yielding that Adv 
